Comments on: About those nukes in Cuba….

By: Nuclear history bibliography, 2012 | Restricted Data

Nuclear history bibliography, 2012 | Restricted Data — Fri, 28 Dec 2012 16:44:30 +0000

[...] a discussion of Norris and Kristensen’s accounting of those nukes in Cuba and elsewhere, see my post here. [...]

By: Curious Wavefunction

Curious Wavefunction — Mon, 03 Dec 2012 17:56:33 +0000

Yes, it’s astonishing. In “The Fog of War”, McNamara said that Castro during a 1992 meeting quoted a total number of 162 warheads, including 90 tactical ones.

By: Lessons from the Crisis | Restricted Data

Lessons from the Crisis | Restricted Data — Fri, 02 Nov 2012 12:39:05 +0000

[...] Crisis was still on-going through early December 1962. The missiles were still there, there were still huge numbers of tactical nuclear weapons on the island, and the military forces of the USA and USSR were still wound up and ready to pounce — nuclear [...]

By: Icepick

Icepick — Thu, 01 Nov 2012 05:31:28 +0000

Thank you for the reply.

I suppose the Russian government hasn’t released any of those old Soviet records so as not to give anything away about their possible current nuclear doctrine. A pity!

By: Bill

Bill — Tue, 30 Oct 2012 15:44:39 +0000

On the Jupiters, they were seen as obsolete and dangerous (luse or lose 1st strike weapons) and there was a lot of talk about removing them, but JFK had not yet approved any plans,mainly for alliance reasons, e.g. the governments of Turkey and Italy had to be persuaded to accept removal. Phil Nash’s book “the Other Missiles of October” (UNC Press) is a terrific book on the Jupiter problem. Of course, once Kennedy had authorized the secret deal involving the Jupiters persuasion became a secondary concern.

By: Patrick McCray

Patrick McCray — Mon, 29 Oct 2012 15:47:35 +0000

Alex-

Have you looked at Stern’s new book on the the CMC?

http://www.amazon.com/Cuban-Missile-Crisis-American-Memory/dp/0804783772

By: Alex Wellerstein

Alex Wellerstein — Fri, 26 Oct 2012 17:47:46 +0000

Hi Ellen: Great question. My understanding is that it’s not so much that they were “too old” but that they were planning to be phased out anyway. So in a way, indeed, the U.S. got a really great deal out of it — no missiles in Cuba, in exchange for removing missiles they were already going to remove. And all we had to do for that deal was to almost have a nuclear war!

By: Ellen Bradbury

Ellen Bradbury — Thu, 25 Oct 2012 20:44:25 +0000

What about the missiles in Turkey? Were they really too old? So what we gave up was not very much? BUt looked good and how could the Soviets know?

By: Patrick McCray

Patrick McCray — Thu, 25 Oct 2012 14:29:04 +0000

Nice…I’ll cross reference this in my first blog post which mentions the crisis. Say hi to Tom Cochran for me when you see him. I know him from back in the day…

By: Alex Wellerstein

Alex Wellerstein — Thu, 25 Oct 2012 14:24:35 +0000

It’s a great question — the fact that we really don’t know is one of the things that came up a few times at the talk. In the US case, for example, the main nuclear strategy was based around pre-emption — taking out their nukes first. So missile bases and airfields go first. It could be dialed up to “destroy their urban/industrial areas” but that was the last of many possibilities. In the Soviet case, I don’t think we know. Exactly what they would have aimed at, and how close they were to doing any of those things (did their bomber pilots already have their plans worked out, were the planes on the runway?) is still unclear. My recollection is that David said that Soviet nuclear doctrine at the time favored first a pre-emptive strike against the United States — a big salvo — then a strike against Europe and an invasion of Europe. But that doesn’t really tell us too much about where those SS-4s would have been targeted, other than the obvious, like Washington.