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	<title>Comments on: Friday Images: Semipalatinsk Then and Now</title>
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	<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/</link>
	<description>The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</description>
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		<title>By: Rare Photos of the Soviet Bomb Project &#124; Restricted Data</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-8118</link>
		<dc:creator>Rare Photos of the Soviet Bomb Project &#124; Restricted Data</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Jul 2012 11:44:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-8118</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] is model of the first Soviet bomb at &#8220;the Polygon,&#8221; which was the code name for the Semipalatinsk test site.5 Somehow it manages to look very futuristic (the big circles, the large poles) and yet quite [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] is model of the first Soviet bomb at &#8220;the Polygon,&#8221; which was the code name for the Semipalatinsk test site.5 Somehow it manages to look very futuristic (the big circles, the large poles) and yet quite [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Nuclear This, That, and &#34;Them&#34; &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6868</link>
		<dc:creator>Nuclear This, That, and &#34;Them&#34; &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Jul 2012 15:38:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6868</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] commentator, Princeton&#8217;s Michael Gordin (whose work I have previously praised), poked at our papers in variously interesting ways. One thing he did ask was where the Soviets [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] commentator, Princeton&#8217;s Michael Gordin (whose work I have previously praised), poked at our papers in variously interesting ways. One thing he did ask was where the Soviets [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Alex Wellerstein</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6754</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex Wellerstein</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Jun 2012 20:24:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6754</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Fascinating! I will see if I can find anything earlier, but I agree with Pavel that it sounds compelling as an explanation.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fascinating! I will see if I can find anything earlier, but I agree with Pavel that it sounds compelling as an explanation.</p>
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		<title>By: Pavel Podvig</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6753</link>
		<dc:creator>Pavel Podvig</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Jun 2012 20:11:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6753</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Vitaly,

Thank you. That&#039;s probably where it came from.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Vitaly,</p>
<p>Thank you. That&#8217;s probably where it came from.</p>
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		<title>By: Vitaly Fedchenko</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6724</link>
		<dc:creator>Vitaly Fedchenko</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jun 2012 10:19:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6724</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Pavel, Alex,

Could it be that the &#039;First Lightning&#039; came about as some kind of an artistic or journalistic metaphor that stuck? I looked at the use of that name in the Soviet books and the 1968 biography of Kurchatov in the famous &quot;ЖЗЛ&quot; series has a chapter named that way, &#039;describing&#039; the production and testing of the RDS-1. The same book has another chapter, called the &#039;Second Lightning&#039;, which talks about Soviet thermonuclear weapons. These &#039;lightnings&#039; are only mentioned in the chapter titles, the author does not imply that these are code words. 

The link to Google Books: http://books.google.se/books?id=NHcLAAAAMAAJ
The text in Russian: http://lib.rus.ec/b/71207/read

So one hypothesis could be that the &#039;First Lightning&#039; is a Soviet propaganda metaphor that got picked up in the West after the publication in the &quot;ЖЗЛ&quot; series, which had a very wide circulation. This hypothesis can be shown to be wrong if there is the use of the &#039;First Lightning&#039; in the Western literature before 1968.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Pavel, Alex,</p>
<p>Could it be that the &#8216;First Lightning&#8217; came about as some kind of an artistic or journalistic metaphor that stuck? I looked at the use of that name in the Soviet books and the 1968 biography of Kurchatov in the famous &#8220;ЖЗЛ&#8221; series has a chapter named that way, &#8216;describing&#8217; the production and testing of the RDS-1. The same book has another chapter, called the &#8216;Second Lightning&#8217;, which talks about Soviet thermonuclear weapons. These &#8216;lightnings&#8217; are only mentioned in the chapter titles, the author does not imply that these are code words. </p>
<p>The link to Google Books: <a href="http://books.google.se/books?id=NHcLAAAAMAAJ" rel="nofollow">http://books.google.se/books?id=NHcLAAAAMAAJ</a><br />
The text in Russian: <a href="http://lib.rus.ec/b/71207/read" rel="nofollow">http://lib.rus.ec/b/71207/read</a></p>
<p>So one hypothesis could be that the &#8216;First Lightning&#8217; is a Soviet propaganda metaphor that got picked up in the West after the publication in the &#8220;ЖЗЛ&#8221; series, which had a very wide circulation. This hypothesis can be shown to be wrong if there is the use of the &#8216;First Lightning&#8217; in the Western literature before 1968.</p>
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		<title>By: Alex Wellerstein</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6711</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex Wellerstein</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Jun 2012 16:37:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6711</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Geeky project idea:  port Ulam&#039;s Super codes to Java, run on a modern day (not-very-smart) cellphone, see how long it takes to show that Teller&#039;s Classical Super was infeasible.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Geeky project idea:  port Ulam&#8217;s Super codes to Java, run on a modern day (not-very-smart) cellphone, see how long it takes to show that Teller&#8217;s Classical Super was infeasible.</p>
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		<title>By: Mike Lehman</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6710</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike Lehman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Jun 2012 16:06:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6710</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The issue of Joe-1&#039;s timing is interesting. Not having read Gordin&#039;s book, I don&#039;t know what he covered of the various aspects of the aftermath of that event. IIRC, more exact timing was pinned down by parsing the acoustic signals later on, but it&#039;s been awhile since I&#039;ve been over that material and its extensive. Joe-1 was the best documented shot in terms of how much is known about its detection, as the AF tended to trumpet its success, while obviously having reasons to be tight-lipped about what followed.

I suspect that part of the issue with the difference in reported timing and the actual timing had to do with the evolving knowledge base of nuclear isotopes in 1949. Based on what they knew at the time about the various decay chains, they made as good an estimate as possible. Later, as the &quot;Tri-Linear Chart of Nuclear Species&quot; was filled in over the next few years, a better estimate came about.

There&#039;s also the issue that R&amp;D for sampling and lab analysis was done at American tests, where the conditions were more under control and known in advance. I don&#039;t know if they did any analyses via double-blind studies, which might have eliminated the possibility of knowing the timing of the shot affecting the way it was analyzed. The samples of Soviet shots had to be captured &quot;in the wild&quot; so to speak. There was no instantaneous forwarding of the limited acoustic signals, for instance. The tapes had to be forwarded by courier, then analyzed for correlation to other data. 

This is in part speculation based on what I do have evidence of, as advanced radio-chemistry is beyond my skill-set. I think a research project that ties the general development of knowledge about various isotopes to the specific ways in which nuclear testing advanced such research would be an interesting history of science research project for someone. i

Whatever the reason was for the timing discrepancy, it&#039;s clear once AFOAT-1&#039;s ad-hoc seismic network became operational in 1950, along with improvements in the Army Signal Corps&#039;-operated acoustic detection network, it quickly made immediate detection of Soviet shot times a routine and accurate matter in most, but not all cases.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The issue of Joe-1&#8242;s timing is interesting. Not having read Gordin&#8217;s book, I don&#8217;t know what he covered of the various aspects of the aftermath of that event. IIRC, more exact timing was pinned down by parsing the acoustic signals later on, but it&#8217;s been awhile since I&#8217;ve been over that material and its extensive. Joe-1 was the best documented shot in terms of how much is known about its detection, as the AF tended to trumpet its success, while obviously having reasons to be tight-lipped about what followed.</p>
<p>I suspect that part of the issue with the difference in reported timing and the actual timing had to do with the evolving knowledge base of nuclear isotopes in 1949. Based on what they knew at the time about the various decay chains, they made as good an estimate as possible. Later, as the &#8220;Tri-Linear Chart of Nuclear Species&#8221; was filled in over the next few years, a better estimate came about.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s also the issue that R&amp;D for sampling and lab analysis was done at American tests, where the conditions were more under control and known in advance. I don&#8217;t know if they did any analyses via double-blind studies, which might have eliminated the possibility of knowing the timing of the shot affecting the way it was analyzed. The samples of Soviet shots had to be captured &#8220;in the wild&#8221; so to speak. There was no instantaneous forwarding of the limited acoustic signals, for instance. The tapes had to be forwarded by courier, then analyzed for correlation to other data. </p>
<p>This is in part speculation based on what I do have evidence of, as advanced radio-chemistry is beyond my skill-set. I think a research project that ties the general development of knowledge about various isotopes to the specific ways in which nuclear testing advanced such research would be an interesting history of science research project for someone. i</p>
<p>Whatever the reason was for the timing discrepancy, it&#8217;s clear once AFOAT-1&#8242;s ad-hoc seismic network became operational in 1950, along with improvements in the Army Signal Corps&#8217;-operated acoustic detection network, it quickly made immediate detection of Soviet shot times a routine and accurate matter in most, but not all cases.</p>
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		<title>By: J B</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6705</link>
		<dc:creator>J B</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jun 2012 23:52:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6705</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Today, we have the luxury of &#039;throwing alot of computer at a problem&#039; to solve complex problems.

It has always astounded me how we were able to accomplish so much, with so little &#039;technology&#039;.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today, we have the luxury of &#8216;throwing alot of computer at a problem&#8217; to solve complex problems.</p>
<p>It has always astounded me how we were able to accomplish so much, with so little &#8216;technology&#8217;.</p>
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		<title>By: What If Truman Hadn&#039;t Ordered the H-bomb Crash Program? &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6699</link>
		<dc:creator>What If Truman Hadn&#039;t Ordered the H-bomb Crash Program? &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:44:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6699</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] 1949: USSR tests its first bomb in a test the US dubs &#8220;Joe-1.&#8221; The US detects it in September. Secret debate begins within US government over whether an [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] 1949: USSR tests its first bomb in a test the US dubs &#8220;Joe-1.&#8221; The US detects it in September. Secret debate begins within US government over whether an [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Alex Wellerstein</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/06/15/friday-images-semipalantisk-then-now/#comment-6690</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex Wellerstein</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jun 2012 02:05:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1771#comment-6690</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I agree, it&#039;s an amazing, beautiful map. They ended up being wrong about the date of the test, but they did a great job in every other respect. Michael&#039;s book goes into all of the gritty details of how they got and made sense of the data; it was an incredible effort. Remarkably, Truman appears to have never really believed the Russians had gotten a real, working bomb. Hence his ambiguous (lack of agency, lack of specificity) announcement: &quot;We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.&quot;]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree, it&#8217;s an amazing, beautiful map. They ended up being wrong about the date of the test, but they did a great job in every other respect. Michael&#8217;s book goes into all of the gritty details of how they got and made sense of the data; it was an incredible effort. Remarkably, Truman appears to have never really believed the Russians had gotten a real, working bomb. Hence his ambiguous (lack of agency, lack of specificity) announcement: &#8220;We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.&#8221;</p>
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