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	<title>Comments on: The Third Shot and Beyond (1945)</title>
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	<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/</link>
	<description>The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sat, 18 May 2013 17:17:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Consensus View? &#124; Restricted Data</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-16165</link>
		<dc:creator>The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Consensus View? &#124; Restricted Data</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2013 14:44:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-16165</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] know. The US was still planning to invade in November 1945. They were planning to drop as many atomic bombs as necessary. There is no contemporary evidence that suggests Truman was ever told that the causalities would [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] know. The US was still planning to invade in November 1945. They were planning to drop as many atomic bombs as necessary. There is no contemporary evidence that suggests Truman was ever told that the causalities would [...]</p>
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		<title>By: &#34;We all aged ten years until the plane cleared the island.&#34; &#124; Restricted Data</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-9732</link>
		<dc:creator>&#34;We all aged ten years until the plane cleared the island.&#34; &#124; Restricted Data</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Aug 2012 16:29:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-9732</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] the worst anti-climax being told not to prepare another atomic bomb for use! What I like about Ramsey&#8217;s letter is it hammers home, again, how primitive the first atomic [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] the worst anti-climax being told not to prepare another atomic bomb for use! What I like about Ramsey&#8217;s letter is it hammers home, again, how primitive the first atomic [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Atomic Editorial Cartoons (August 1945) &#124; Restricted Data</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-6998</link>
		<dc:creator>Atomic Editorial Cartoons (August 1945) &#124; Restricted Data</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jul 2012 14:28:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-6998</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] that the war would be ending soon. This was still a few days before the Japanese capitulation — which was not entirely expected. One wonders how the view of the bomb would have changed if Japan hadn&#8217;t surrendered and the [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] that the war would be ending soon. This was still a few days before the Japanese capitulation — which was not entirely expected. One wonders how the view of the bomb would have changed if Japan hadn&#8217;t surrendered and the [...]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Nuclear This, That, and &#34;Them&#34; &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-6866</link>
		<dc:creator>Nuclear This, That, and &#34;Them&#34; &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Jul 2012 15:30:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-6866</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] commentator, Princeton&#8217;s Michael Gordin (whose work I have previously praised), poked at our papers in variously interesting ways. One thing he did ask was where the [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] commentator, Princeton&#8217;s Michael Gordin (whose work I have previously praised), poked at our papers in variously interesting ways. One thing he did ask was where the [...]</p>
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		<title>By: What If Truman Hadn&#039;t Ordered the H-bomb Crash Program? &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-6698</link>
		<dc:creator>What If Truman Hadn&#039;t Ordered the H-bomb Crash Program? &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:41:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-6698</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] ultimate &#8220;What If?&#8220; of the atomic bomb is, &#8220;what if they didn&#8217;t drop the bomb?&#8221; The ultimate [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] ultimate &#8220;What If?&#8220; of the atomic bomb is, &#8220;what if they didn&#8217;t drop the bomb?&#8221; The ultimate [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Alex Wellerstein</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-5917</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex Wellerstein</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 May 2012 21:13:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-5917</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There is really zero evidence of any substance that the US captured enriched uranium from the U-234. Germany was simply not in any position to enrich that much material; that is considerably more than was used in Little Boy. It is silly to imagine that it would be enriched uranium.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is really zero evidence of any substance that the US captured enriched uranium from the U-234. Germany was simply not in any position to enrich that much material; that is considerably more than was used in Little Boy. It is silly to imagine that it would be enriched uranium.</p>
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		<title>By: Terrence O'Neill</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-5914</link>
		<dc:creator>Terrence O'Neill</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 May 2012 20:55:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-5914</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Interesting comments about the bombing of Japan in 1945, some seem at odds with the reports of the Air Force and particularly with those of Gen. Curtis LeMay who the General Arnold put in charge of this task after the first General was replaced, and until Gen. Spaatz came in at the end  and took over.  LeMay had invented fire-bombing of all the major industrial cities, even running out of incendiaries until the Navy delivered those they though LeMay really didn&#039;t need. The post-war reports of debriefed Japanese officers regarding the planned invasion of the southern island, closing schools, arming children and old citizens with sharpened sticks, transferring Army to the island, keeping Kamikazi aircraft and boats ready for the invasion fleet expected in November, leave little doubt that the Japanese would fight to the death as they did on Okinawa, to the chagrin of tour invasion planners, and they expected a million American casualties... three times what we had lost so-far. In researching my just-published book &quot;Goodbye Beautiful Wing&quot; (AMAZON OR B&amp;N) I retell LeMay&#039;s own account of his failed attempt to bomb the Japanese into submission by destroying all major cities. The surrender of their huge Japanese I-class submarine aircraft carriers at the end of the war make it clear the Japanese planned to bomb San Francisco with radiation-scattering bombs, using the 1100 pounds of weapons-grade uranium we captured in May 1945 in the surrender of German U-234, ordered to Japan -- until the death of Hitler.
It seems to me that the real reason that Hirohito opposed the Japanese Generals who wanted to continue the war is probably because he realized the Americans would soon drop a big one on Tokyo, Imperial Palace not withstanding.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting comments about the bombing of Japan in 1945, some seem at odds with the reports of the Air Force and particularly with those of Gen. Curtis LeMay who the General Arnold put in charge of this task after the first General was replaced, and until Gen. Spaatz came in at the end  and took over.  LeMay had invented fire-bombing of all the major industrial cities, even running out of incendiaries until the Navy delivered those they though LeMay really didn&#8217;t need. The post-war reports of debriefed Japanese officers regarding the planned invasion of the southern island, closing schools, arming children and old citizens with sharpened sticks, transferring Army to the island, keeping Kamikazi aircraft and boats ready for the invasion fleet expected in November, leave little doubt that the Japanese would fight to the death as they did on Okinawa, to the chagrin of tour invasion planners, and they expected a million American casualties&#8230; three times what we had lost so-far. In researching my just-published book &#8220;Goodbye Beautiful Wing&#8221; (AMAZON OR B&amp;N) I retell LeMay&#8217;s own account of his failed attempt to bomb the Japanese into submission by destroying all major cities. The surrender of their huge Japanese I-class submarine aircraft carriers at the end of the war make it clear the Japanese planned to bomb San Francisco with radiation-scattering bombs, using the 1100 pounds of weapons-grade uranium we captured in May 1945 in the surrender of German U-234, ordered to Japan &#8212; until the death of Hitler.<br />
It seems to me that the real reason that Hirohito opposed the Japanese Generals who wanted to continue the war is probably because he realized the Americans would soon drop a big one on Tokyo, Imperial Palace not withstanding.</p>
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		<title>By: JH</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-5619</link>
		<dc:creator>JH</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 12 May 2012 04:30:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-5619</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Hi Ward, 

You are mistaken though when it comes to the range of the bombers and the targets:

&quot;&lt;i&gt;After Nagasaki was bombed, Japan had nine large cities (populations over 100,000) that had not been bombed. They were Kyoto (1,089,726), Sapporo (206,103), Hakodate (203,862), Yokosuka (193,358), Kanazawa (186,297), Kokura (173,639), Otaru (164,282), Niigata (150,903), and Fuse (134,724) [Figures are for 1944 from Japan Statistical Yearbook]. Sapporo, Hakodate, and Otaru were on the northernmost island of Hokkaido and were, therefore, beyond the range of U.S. bombers operating from Tinian Island. So six targets were available. US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had removed Kyoto from the target list because of its religious and cultural importance. So five targets were available. Compared with the number of cities that already lay in ruins, five more would have been, well, small potatoes. Of course, it would have been possible to re-bomb some cities that had already been bombed, but on average these were already 50% destroyed.&lt;/i&gt;&quot;

Sapporo, Hakodate and Otaru could all be reached by the B-29s operating out of Tinian: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P2/Images/p_144.jpg and http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/April%202010/0410mission.aspx . The distance from Tinian to Sapporo is just under 2,000 miles and a B-29&#039;s range (i.e. being able to fly out, bomb a target and come back) is listed as being over 3,000 miles. Indeed some B-29s got in trouble over Japan and had to make emergency landings in the USSR (which would be further than flying to Hokkaido), where they were reverse engineered as the Tu-4 (much to Tupolev&#039;s displeasure since he designed aircraft for a living and loathed the idea of being ordered to copy an existing aircraft) and then returned to the USA. The crewmen were interned since the USSR was neutral in the war against Japan at the time and Stalin wasn&#039;t about to give the Japanese a reason to start hostilities before he finished with Germany (although the USSR did allow the US airmen to &quot;escape&quot; into Iran which was being occupied by the Soviets, British and Americans at the time, whereupon they returned to the USA).

And Sapporo was indeed considered as a target. The original targets under consideration in April 1945 were Tokyo Bay (for a non-lethal demonstration), Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, Kokura, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Sasebo. A number of these were scratched since they had already been burnt to the ground. Then in May the list under consideration was (in order): Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, the Kokura Arsenal and Niigata with the Emperor&#039;s Palace discussed as a possible target but rejected. This list was then narrowed down to Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama and Kokura Arsenal with Niigata under consideration. At the end of May this list is then narrowed down to Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Niigata. A couple days later Stimson rules out Kyoto as a target. By late July the target list is Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata. Nagasaki is then added as the final target in the list. 

For the missions themselves Hiroshima was the primary target and Kokura the secondary in case Hiroshima couldn&#039;t be bombed. After Hiroshima was bombed the next target was Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki as the secondary target. So were it not for clear skies over Hiroshima and cloudy ones over Kokura the Kokura would definitely have been bombed at some point by August 9.

Now according to Richard B. Frank in his book &lt;i&gt;Downfall&lt;/i&gt;  (p. 303) after the bombing of Nagasaki the commanders in the Pacific made their own recommendations on targets for future weapons. Specifically, Admiral Nimitz, General Carl Spaatz (commander of the United States Strategic Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific) and General Nathan Twining (commander of Twentieth Air Force, formerly XXI Bomber Command, based on the Marianas and containing the B-29s on the islands including those of the 509th Composite Group tasked with dropping the atomic bombs) met with General Farrell and Captain Parsons (both of who were on the Target Committee for the atomic bomb). By the afternoon of August 9 all of these folks were urging Washington to review  the target lists in light of the bombs so far having &quot;far exceeded optimistic expectations&quot;. On August 14, General Twining submitted a new list of six targets (in order): Sapporo, Hakodate, Oyabu, Yokosuka, Osaka and Nagoya.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Ward, </p>
<p>You are mistaken though when it comes to the range of the bombers and the targets:</p>
<p>&#8220;<i>After Nagasaki was bombed, Japan had nine large cities (populations over 100,000) that had not been bombed. They were Kyoto (1,089,726), Sapporo (206,103), Hakodate (203,862), Yokosuka (193,358), Kanazawa (186,297), Kokura (173,639), Otaru (164,282), Niigata (150,903), and Fuse (134,724) [Figures are for 1944 from Japan Statistical Yearbook]. Sapporo, Hakodate, and Otaru were on the northernmost island of Hokkaido and were, therefore, beyond the range of U.S. bombers operating from Tinian Island. So six targets were available. US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had removed Kyoto from the target list because of its religious and cultural importance. So five targets were available. Compared with the number of cities that already lay in ruins, five more would have been, well, small potatoes. Of course, it would have been possible to re-bomb some cities that had already been bombed, but on average these were already 50% destroyed.</i>&#8221;</p>
<p>Sapporo, Hakodate and Otaru could all be reached by the B-29s operating out of Tinian: <a href="http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P2/Images/p_144.jpg" rel="nofollow">http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P2/Images/p_144.jpg</a> and <a href="http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/April%202010/0410mission.aspx" rel="nofollow">http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/April%202010/0410mission.aspx</a> . The distance from Tinian to Sapporo is just under 2,000 miles and a B-29&#8242;s range (i.e. being able to fly out, bomb a target and come back) is listed as being over 3,000 miles. Indeed some B-29s got in trouble over Japan and had to make emergency landings in the USSR (which would be further than flying to Hokkaido), where they were reverse engineered as the Tu-4 (much to Tupolev&#8217;s displeasure since he designed aircraft for a living and loathed the idea of being ordered to copy an existing aircraft) and then returned to the USA. The crewmen were interned since the USSR was neutral in the war against Japan at the time and Stalin wasn&#8217;t about to give the Japanese a reason to start hostilities before he finished with Germany (although the USSR did allow the US airmen to &#8220;escape&#8221; into Iran which was being occupied by the Soviets, British and Americans at the time, whereupon they returned to the USA).</p>
<p>And Sapporo was indeed considered as a target. The original targets under consideration in April 1945 were Tokyo Bay (for a non-lethal demonstration), Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, Kokura, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Sasebo. A number of these were scratched since they had already been burnt to the ground. Then in May the list under consideration was (in order): Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, the Kokura Arsenal and Niigata with the Emperor&#8217;s Palace discussed as a possible target but rejected. This list was then narrowed down to Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama and Kokura Arsenal with Niigata under consideration. At the end of May this list is then narrowed down to Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Niigata. A couple days later Stimson rules out Kyoto as a target. By late July the target list is Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata. Nagasaki is then added as the final target in the list. </p>
<p>For the missions themselves Hiroshima was the primary target and Kokura the secondary in case Hiroshima couldn&#8217;t be bombed. After Hiroshima was bombed the next target was Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki as the secondary target. So were it not for clear skies over Hiroshima and cloudy ones over Kokura the Kokura would definitely have been bombed at some point by August 9.</p>
<p>Now according to Richard B. Frank in his book <i>Downfall</i>  (p. 303) after the bombing of Nagasaki the commanders in the Pacific made their own recommendations on targets for future weapons. Specifically, Admiral Nimitz, General Carl Spaatz (commander of the United States Strategic Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific) and General Nathan Twining (commander of Twentieth Air Force, formerly XXI Bomber Command, based on the Marianas and containing the B-29s on the islands including those of the 509th Composite Group tasked with dropping the atomic bombs) met with General Farrell and Captain Parsons (both of who were on the Target Committee for the atomic bomb). By the afternoon of August 9 all of these folks were urging Washington to review  the target lists in light of the bombs so far having &#8220;far exceeded optimistic expectations&#8221;. On August 14, General Twining submitted a new list of six targets (in order): Sapporo, Hakodate, Oyabu, Yokosuka, Osaka and Nagoya.</p>
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		<title>By: Weekly Document: The First Atomic Stockpile Requirements (September 1945) &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-5521</link>
		<dc:creator>Weekly Document: The First Atomic Stockpile Requirements (September 1945) &#187; Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2012 12:34:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-5521</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] cut to the chase. How many bombs did the USAAF request of the atomic general, when there were maybe one, maybe two bombs worth of fissile material on hand? At a minimum they wanted 123. Ideally, they&#8217;d like [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] cut to the chase. How many bombs did the USAAF request of the atomic general, when there were maybe one, maybe two bombs worth of fissile material on hand? At a minimum they wanted 123. Ideally, they&#8217;d like [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Cthippo</title>
		<link>http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/25/weekly-document-the-third-shot-and-beyond-1945/#comment-5514</link>
		<dc:creator>Cthippo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2012 09:02:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/?p=1391#comment-5514</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I don&#039;t think Groves would have promised more than he really believed he could reliably deliver.  At the time, the size of the stockpile, or at least rate of production, would have been &lt;b&gt;the&lt;/b&gt; big question and it would be quickly obvious if Groves guessed wrong on it.  If anything, I suspect the good general would have erred on the side of under promising and over delivering.

  As for the source of the fissile material, I suspect it was increasing capacity at K25 which was just starting to come online at that time.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t think Groves would have promised more than he really believed he could reliably deliver.  At the time, the size of the stockpile, or at least rate of production, would have been <b>the</b> big question and it would be quickly obvious if Groves guessed wrong on it.  If anything, I suspect the good general would have erred on the side of under promising and over delivering.</p>
<p>  As for the source of the fissile material, I suspect it was increasing capacity at K25 which was just starting to come online at that time.</p>
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